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Abstract
Privatization in Eastern Europe has helped transition the regions economies from planned
to free market. However, the e¤ects of privatization on the environment are relatively un-
known and many rms remain under state ownership today. We compare the environmental
performance of state-owned and privatized energy utility plants in Eastern Europe utilizing
a novel panel data that includes reported sulfur dioxide emissions, energy input, and owner-
ship status. We nd that state-owned plants emit more sulfur dioxide than privately owned
plants; this is environmentally signicant as privatization is associated with a reduction in
emissions of about 55 percent.
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1 Introduction
There are various reasons why a country may or may not choose to retain public ownership
of energy utilities.1 Using Poland as an example, the Polish Ministry of Economy listed three
objectives for its energy industry in 2000: 1) energy security 2) improvement of competitive-
ness in energy sector and 3) protection of the environment (Jouret, 2006). Polish citizens
that are used to state-owned energy utilities might view government control of energy as
more secure than private control (Nestor and Mahboobi, 2000). Competitiveness would the-
oretically improve with privatization (Holder, 2000). However, it is not conceptually clear
what the e¤ect of privatization would be on the environment. We aim to investigate this
by comparing environmental performance as measured by sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions
for privatized and state-owned energy utilities. SO2 is a pollutant that has relatively well-
understood abatement technologies and environmental e¤ects making it a logical choice for
examining rm behavior. We concentrate on the energy utilities industry because many of
the largest emitters of SO2 are energy utilities and various governments have retained sig-
nicant ownership in this sector. The energy sector makes up approximately 95 percent of
Polands total SO2 emissions (Poland Ministry of the Environment, 2007).
Beginning in the early 1990s Eastern European governments privatized many rms that
were previously under state control. This provided a source of revenue for government and
propelled the transition toward a market economy. While some rms were privatized, oth-
ers remained under state control. Presently, governments continue to contemplate selling
state-owned rms in various industries such as telecommunications and electricity genera-
1By energy utilities we are referring to electricity generating and combined heat and power plants.
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tion. Poland is a leading example of the approach that Eastern European governments have
pursued. According to Jouret (2006), Poland has privatized ten out of its twenty-three com-
bined heat and power (CHP) plants. Of its dedicated electricity generation plants, Poland
has privatized only four and retains sole ownership of 75 percent of the electricity generation
capacity (Jouret, 2006).2
Using a novel plant level data set of Eastern European energy utilities, we investigate
SO2 emissions of state-owned and privatized plants between the years of 2004 and 2009.
This data set contains virtually all of the electricity generating and CHP plants larger than
50 MWth in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. Approximately
eleven percent of our 320 sample plants switch from state-owned to privatized during our
study period. Exploiting this within-plant variation in ownership we nd that, all else
equal, privatized plants pollute less than state-owned plants. While some previous studies
(Eskeland and Harrison, 2003; Cole, Elliott, and Strobl, 2008) utilize energy use as a proxy
for emissions, we make use of actual plant level SO2 emissions as reported to The EUs
Environment Agency. This can be an important di¤erence since the correlation of energy
use to SO2 emissions is only about 0.54 in our dataset.
From a policy perspective, it is useful to understand how plant ownership can potentially
a¤ect SO2 emissions. SO2 can cause acid rain, which damages aquatic ecosystems and
soil quality, harms forests, and deteriorates buildings and infrastructure. In addition, SO2
contributes to respiratory problems as a local and regional air pollutant. The European
Union regulates SO2 emissions because of these adverse consequences. Under several pieces
2Note that these statements were accurate at the time but Poland has since privatized more energy
utilities.
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of legislation, including the Large Combustion Plant Directive (LCPD), member countries
are obligated to monitor and report emissions and conform to the standards developed in
the directive. The LCPD requires member states to limit sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide,
and particulate matter emissions from combustion plants with a rated thermal input of 50
MWth or more, so there will be increasing pressure to reduce emissions from energy utilities.
Furthermore, the EU member countries still owning a large share of their energy utilities
plants, such as Poland and Romania, will undoubtedly investigate privatizing more energy
utilities in the future. Our results suggest that this privatization could lead to lower SO2
emissions.
2 Previous Literature
The literature on privatization has been extensive over the past twenty years. There are
many papers that compare nancial performance of state-owned rms to rms that have
been privatized. Meggison and Netter (2001) provide a summary of empirical studies that
compare performance of state and private rms. These studies largely conclude that privately
owned rms are more e¢ cient and protable than state-owned rms. There are also other
studies that look at various aspects of performance of state and private rms, including
the impact of ownership on performance (Frydman, Gray, Hessel, and Rapaczynski, 1999;
Frydman, Hessel, and Rapaczynski, 2000).
There are few studies that compare the environmental performance of state and privatized
rms. Beladi and Chao (2006) develop a theoretical model where they show that under
certain conditions privatization can be harmful to the environment. Cato (2008), shows that
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privatization in a mixed market industry with high negative externalities can also be harmful
to the environment. There is no direct empirical comparison of environmental performance
for state-owned and private-owned rms. We do know that more productive rms tend to
pollute less (Holladay, 2010) and that private rms are more productive than state-owned
rms (Meggison and Netter, 2001; Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001; Brown, Earle and Telegdy,
2006). This would lead us to a hypothesis that private-owned rms pollute less than state-
owned but no formal studies have been conducted. Earnhart and Lizal (2006) examine the
e¤ects of ownership structure and nancial performance on environmental performance in
the Czech Republic. They examine rms from a wide variety of industries and nd that
state ownership improves environmental performance relative to other ownership structures.
There are several studies that examine how rm ownership impacts the pollution behavior
of rms. This literature compares environmental performance of rms based on foreign
ownership and domestic ownership; the results are mixed. Collins and Harris (2002) nd that
foreign-owned plants spend more on pollution abatement technology than do domestically
owned rms. Eskeland and Harrison (2003) nd that foreign owned rms pollute less than
domestically owned rms. In contrast, Cole, Elliott, and Strobl (2008) utilize a sample
of Ghanaian rms and nd that foreign ownership is associated with an increased use of
electricity. The inconclusive results may stem from the fact that these studies use energy
as a proxy for emissions since data on plant emissions are not readily available. Solely
examining energy input ignores the di¤ering abatement technologies among rms. Energy
use would not, for example, capture the installation of scrubbers or the use of low sulfur
coal.
Furthermore, a majority of studies on privatization use data on manufacturing rms
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since the largest sector that was privatized was manufacturing. Privatization of energy
utilities in developing and transitional countries slowly started in the last decade but most
of the energy utilities are only now being sold. The environmental impacts of privatizing
energy utilities have not been studied. Studies such as Williams and Ghanadan (2006)
for developing and transitional countries and Jamasb and Pollitt (2005) for the European
Union summarize the current state of reforms and liberalization carried out in the electricity
market. No conclusions are presented regarding electricity market reform and its impact on
environment.
Several papers have investigated the link between increased environmental regulation and
nancial performance. The Porter Hypothesisstates more stringent regulations initiate
innovation in companies(Brannlund and Lundgren, 2009). According to the Hypothesis,
this innovation then translates into better competitiveness and hence better protability.
However, the Porter Hypothesis has not received much theoretical or empirical support. On
the contrary, several studies nd evidence against the Porter Hypothesis (Brannlund and
Lundgren, 2009; Rassier and Earnhart, 2010).
There are also studies that address the restructuring of regulations and the corresponding
e¤ects on electricity generation e¢ ciency. For example, Fabrizio, Rose, and Wolfram (2007)
examine the US electricity market to analyze how changing from cost-of-service regulation to
market competition impacts the e¢ ciency of investor-owned rms. They focus on estimating
production functions to assess e¢ ciency gains from restructuring and incorporate rmscost
minimization. They nd that changing to more market oriented environments improves
the e¢ ciency of investor-owned electricity rms, while publicly-owned rms that were not
impacted by restructuring experience little gain in e¢ ciency; hence competition improves
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e¢ ciency in this regulated industry. The e¤ect of market restructuring on rmspollution
levels is not addressed.
As noted by Earnhart and Lizal (2006), liquidity constraints play a potentially important
role in a plants environmental performance. Plants with poor past and present protability
will have more di¢ culty obtaining external nancing. Moreover, if a plant is constrained in
its access to capital markets, it needs to utilize internal nancing from retained prots to
undertake capital investments. Thus, a plant with negative or poor protability experiences
signicant liquidity constraints. There may be plants that would like to invest in pollution
abatement technology but are prevented from doing so due to lack of nancing. Since this
constraint lessens as protability increases, plants with greater protability will be able
to undertake desired capital investments. There is evidence from Uliasz-Bochenczyk and
Mokrzycki (2007) that Polish plants were investing in desulfurization facilities during our
study period so it appears that plants were in fact interested in enhancing environmental
performance with capital projects.3
Uliasz-Bochenczyk and Mokrzycki (2007) examine the emissions from the Polish power
industry. They note that numerous investments in new devices in the Polish professional
power industry are being carried out or the existing devices updated, . . . , resulting in reduc-
tion of harmful emission into the environment.They state that Polish SO2 emissions have
decreased from 1,221,992 Mg in 1995 to 679,849 Mg in 2005. Also, desulfurization facilities
in Poland increased from 1 to 31 between 1998 and 2005. Therefore, there is evidence that
some rms in our study area were in fact investing in SO2 abatement technology during our
3We unfortunately do not have su¢ cient nancial information to test whether or not protability a¤ects
emissions in this paper.
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study period.
3 Conceptual Framework
Here we develop a simple conceptual framework to explain why we might expect to see
di¤erences in emissions between state-owned and privatized plants. We rst assume that
privatized and state-owned plants do not di¤er in their marginal benet or marginal cost of
emissions. From the standard theory of the rm, privately owned businesses seek to maximize
prots. Hence, we assume that a privatized plant chooses the level of emissions that equates
its private marginal benet from emissions and their private marginal cost from emissions.
For a given level of production, the marginal benet from emissions is reduced emissions
control costs. As noted in Earnhart and Lizal (2006), the marginal cost of emissions for a
plant includes potential ine¢ cient use of inputs, increased emission charges, and increased
regulatory attention and penalties. Let z represent the level of emissions. MB(z) represents
the marginal benet from increased emissions. MB(z) is decreasing in emissions because
emissions marginal control costs increase with higher levels of control. MC(z) represents the
marginal cost from increased emissions, which is increasing in emissions. Then, MB(z) =
MC(z) implicitly denes a prot-maximizing level of emissions, z.
Following Earnhart and Lizal (2006), we assume that state-owned plants may not nec-
essarily be maximizing prots. Denote the level of emissions generated by a state rm as
zs:
(Hypothesis 1): If emissions control costs under state ownership are higher than the
prot maximizing level such that MB(zs) > MC(zs) (excessive control costs), private own-
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Figure 1: Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2:
ership will increase emissions relative to state ownership.
(Hypothesis 2): If emissions costs under state ownership are higher than the prot
maximizing level such that MB(zs) < MC(zs) (too little control costs), private ownership
will decrease emissions relative to state ownership.
In this context, di¤erences in prot maximizing behavior are driving di¤erences in emis-
sions. Furthermore, emissions can conceptually be higher or lower under private ownership
depending on the nature of the non-optimal decision-making by state-owned plants.
Next, we allow for the possibility that the marginal cost curves di¤er between state-owned
and privatized plants while still assuming identical marginal benet curves. In addition to
the components of marginal cost of emissions previously mentioned, we acknowledge that
state-owned and privatized plants may face di¤erent pressures from regulators and may have
di¤erent preferences for environmental protection. Denote the marginal cost curve for a
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privatized plant as MCp(z) and the marginal cost curve for a state-owned plant as MCs(z):
Assume that both types of plants act optimally by equating their respective marginal cost
curves to their marginal benet curves. Denote the level of emissions generated by the state
plant as zs and the level of emissions generated by the private plant as zp when they are
behaving optimally.
First, we examine the relationship between regulatory attention and ownership status.
(Hypothesis 3a): Suppose state-owned plants receive less regulatory attention than
privatized plants. In this case, MCp(z) > MCs(z): Then, zs > zp and we observe higher
emissions from state-owned plants.
(Hypothesis 3b): Suppose state-owned plants receive more pressure to achieve better
environmental performance. In this case, MCs(z) > MCp(z): Then, zs < zp and we observe
lower emissions from state-owned plants.
Thus, the relationship between ownership status and regulatory pressure is ambiguous.
Next, we examine the relationship between ownership status and relative concern for
environmental protection. State-owned plants might have higher relative concerns for envi-
ronmental protection because they are seeking to please government o¢ cials or the public.
Conversely, privatized plants might have higher relative concerns for environmental protec-
tion because of public image concerns in the country of production and potentially in foreign
markets.
(Hypothesis 4a): Suppose privatized plants have higher relative concern for environ-
mental protection. This will lead the privatized plant to internalize more of the damages
from emissions to society and MCs(z) < MCp(z): Then, zs > zp and we observe higher
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Figure 2: Hypothesis 3a, Hypothesis 3b, Hypothesis 4a, and Hypothesis 4b:
emissions from state-owned plants.
(Hypothesis 4b): Suppose state-owned plants have higher relative concern for environ-
mental protection. This will lead the state-owned plants to internalize more of the damages
from emissions to society and MCs(z) > MCp(z): Then, zs < zp and we observe lower
emissions from state-owned plants.
Again, ownership status has a conceptually ambiguous e¤ect.
Within this simple conceptual framework, we have three possible explanations for why
state-owned plants would have higher emissions and three possible explanations why priva-
tized plants would have higher emissions. Hence, it is not clear which ownership status should
be conceptually associated with higher emissions. We therefore empirically investigate the
relationship.
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4 Data and EU Regulatory Background
Prior to describing our data, we explain the EU regulatory context during our study period
(2004-2009). There are two major pieces of EU legislation that a¤ected emissions at energy
utilities during the mid to late 2000s: The Large Combustion Plant Directive (LCPD /
Directive 2001/80/EC) and the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS).
4.1 LCPD
With the goal of improving human and environmental health, the EU adopted the LCPD in
October 2001, with the regulations taking e¤ect January 2008. January 2008 is toward the
end our study period but, since the legislation was passed in 2001, some plants may have be-
gun preparing for the changes earlier in our study period. Thus, we explain the legislation in
some detail to give an idea about the regulatory environment for which plants were preparing
during the mid 2000s. The LCPD is a complex EU directive that requires Member States
to reduce emissions of sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and particulate matter from com-
bustion plants with a rated thermal input of 50 MWth or more (Ritchie et al., 2005). Plants
with thermal input of this scale include power utilities, oil reneries, and large industrial
manufacturers such as steelworks plants. "For existing plants (licensed before 1 July 1987),
each Member State is able to choose between complying with emission limit values (ELVs)
as set out in part A of Annexes II to VII or implementing a national emission reduction
plan as dened in Article 4(6). The compliance date for existing plants is 1 January 2008"
(Ritchie et al., 2005). The national emission reduction plan essentially must reduce the total
annual emissions for the Member State to the same levels that would have been achieved
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by applying the ELVs to each of the Member States existing plants in 2000. However, the
Czech Republic is the only country in our sample that led for the national reduction plan.
The Czech Republics national emission limit values are actually slightly more stringent than
the LCPD values for some plants (Ritchie et al., 2005).
All new plants (licensed after July 1, 1987) must comply with the ELVs. Furthermore,
plants licensed before November 27, 2002 must comply with the ELVs from part A of Annexes
III to VIII, while plants licensed after November 27, 2002 must comply with more stringent
ELVs described in part B of Annexes III to VII (Ritchie et al., 2005). Table 1 presents the
ELVs for SO2 for new and existing plants. Note that the ELVs di¤er by the fuel type that
is being burned. Liquid and solid fuels have much more lenient limits than natural gas.
All rms in the other countries are subject to the LCPD with several exceptions. The
rst exception is the so-called "limited life derogation clause." As noted by Ritchie et al.
(2005), an operator of an existing plant may be exempted from compliance with the ELVs
(emission limit values) and from inclusion in a national emission reduction plan if a written
undertaken was submitted to the competent authority by 30 June 2004, not to operate the
plant for more than 20,000 operational hours starting from 1 January 2008 and ending no
later than 31 December 2015." Thus, rms opting for this limited life derogation would be
able to operate on average a little less than seven hours a day and must be completely
shut-down by 2015. If run continuously for 24 hours a day, rms opting for the limited
life derogation would have shut down by March of 2010. As these rms have much more
lenient limits on emissions for their shortened lives, they have less incentive to install ue gas
desulfurization technologies (FGD, i.e. wet or dry sulfur scrubbers) or switch to low sulfur
coal.
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Table 1: LCPD Emission Limit Values for SO2
Fuel Type Size of Plant
Existing Plants 50 to 100 MWth 100 to 300 MWth >300 MWth
Solid Fuels 2000 2000 to 400 400
(linear decrease)
Liquid Fuels 1700 1700 to 400 400
(linear decrease)
Gaseous Fuels in general 35 35 35
Liqueed gas 5 5 5
Low caloric gases 800 800 800
New Plants
Biomass 200 200 200
Other Solid Fuels 850 200 200
Liquid Fuels 850 400 to 200 200
(linear decrease)
Gaseous Fuels in general 35 35 35
Liqueed gas 5 5 5
Low caloric gases from
coke oven 400 400 400
Low caloric gases from
blast furnace 200 200 200
Note: All ELVs are in mg/Nm3
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The second broad category of exceptions to the LCPD consists of derogation allowances
given to several New Member States. These New Member States have treaty conditions that
allow them to exempt certain plants from various ELVs for a specied time period. As noted
by Ritchie et al. (2005), "the countries with the most extensive derogation allowances, as well
as the only countries with derogation allowances beyond 2008, include Estonia, Lithuania,
and Poland." Nonetheless, all countries will eventually be faced with the ELVs stated in the
LCPD. There are several EU countries that have national ELVs that are more stringent than
the LCPD ELVs. According to the information that we are able to nd, most of the national
ELVs for our study countries are less stringent than the LCPD ELVs.
4.2 EU ETS
January 1, 2005 marked the beginning of the operation of the EU ETS program in which
"virtually all stationary, industrial, and electricity-generating installations within the EU"
pay a price for carbon emissions (Ellerman and Buchner, 2007). Although this legislation
does not directly regulate SO2 emissions, plants changing their behavior in response to
carbon regulations could conceivably alter their SO2 emissions. For example, if a plant were
to undergo a retrot to switch fuel inputs from coal to natural gas or biomass, they could
capture revenue by selling a carbon emissions permit, which would at the same time reduce
SO2 emissions. Or, simply reducing output would reduce carbon emissions as well as SO2
emissions. Thus, we briey overview the ETS.
As identied by Ellerman and Buchner (2007), the largest problem with the initial im-
plementation of the EU ETS was the absence of reliable, available data at the installation
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level. Due to this data scarcity, the EU gathered data on a voluntary basis directly from
the regulated sources. This data was then used to determine the allocations to the instal-
lations. While one might be suspicious of the self-reported emissions, "participants in the
process reported relatively few cases of fraudulent submissions" (Ellerman and Buchner,
2007). Regardless of the cause, the May 2005 emissions data released in April and May of
2006 revealed that the number of allowances distributed to installations in 2005 exceeded
those installationsemissions by about 80 billion tons (4% of the EU cap). Subsequently,
the price for rst period allowances fell by one-half and second period future prices fell by
one-third.
In order to reduce carbon emissions, the EU would need to allocate a shortage of emissions
allowances. "Broadly speaking, this expected shortage for the EU as a whole was allocated
to the EU15 and, within the EU15, to the electricity utility sector" (Ellerman and Buchner,
2007). None of the plants represented in our sample come from EU15 countries. As explained
by Ellerman and Buchner (2007), all new EU10 countries (including the Czech Republic,
Hungary, and Poland) were long on emissions permits in 2005. This could be a result of
overallocation, lower output, or abatement. An overly generous initial allocation of permits
to EU10 countries would not likely cause signicant changes in SO2 emissions because plants
would simply sell the excess permits. However, a reduction in output or fuel switching to
abate carbon emissions could cause signicant changes in SO2 emissions at EU10 plants.
Bulgaria and Romania did not joint the EU until January 1, 2007.
The case of Poland again provides an illustrative example. According to Jouret (2006,
p22), "for the 2005-2007 trading period, the Polish electricity sector received a signicant
surplus of emission rights. However, because regulations were not implemented, the emission
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trading scheme in fact still does not function in Poland." Jouret (2006) continues to explain
that Polands average emission limit for the 2008-2012 trading period will be around 60
million tons higher than the 390 million tons of forecasted annual emissions for the period.
Finally, Jouret (2006) concludes that the ETS would not likely signicantly a¤ect emissions
or the fuel mix in Poland.
4.3 Plant Environmental Performance and Ownership Data
To establish the link between privatization and SO2 emissions we construct an unbalanced
panel by merging information frommultiple data sources. We begin by identifying 402 energy
utilities in the EU Large Combustion Plant Directive (LCPD) data in the ve countries that
we study: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. Spanning the years
2004 to 2009 and managed by the European Environment Agency, the LCPD data set
contains information about SO2 emissions as well as the associated thermal input ratings
and energy usage for plants that fall under the directive.
Next, we identify the ownership of each of these plants for the years of 2004-2009. This
information comes from several sources. Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishings (BvDEP)
Zephyr database is a merger and acquisition (M&A) database that allows users to identify
deals that were done through privatization. Zephyr has information on deals and potential
deals involving privatization of power generating plants and combined heat and power (CHP)
plants between 1997 and 2006. This provides ownership information on 66 of the LCPD
plants. For plants that are not found in the Zephyr database, we conduct an extensive
internet search to nd a reliable source detailing ownership information. We nd either a date
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of privatization or information that the plant was still state-owned at the end of our study
period. Reliable sources include published news articles, governmental and non-governmental
research studies, and o¢ cial websites of the energy utilities.4 Plants that were built privately
and never state-owned are removed from the sample. Subsequently, we are left with a sample
of 320 energy utility plants on which to base our analysis. Table 2 gives a comparison of
the number of plants in the LCPD data with the number of plants in our sample from
each country. For our six year panel, we have a total of 1,920 plant-year observations on the
ownership variable, 1,683 observations on energy input, 1,811 observations on plant capacity,
and 1,851 observations on SO2 emissions. We have six years of SO2 emissions for 286 plants,
ve years of SO2 emissions for 14 plants, four years of SO2 emissions for ve plants, and
three years of SO2 emissions for 15 plants, which means that 89 percent of our rms have
no missing information on the dependent variable.
Table 3 shows that, of the plant-year level observations, roughly one-quarter are privately
owned and three-quarters are state-owned. Note that the ownership composition of the
sample evolves over the six years. In this panel, 52 plants are always privately held and
231 are always state-owned. As such, these two groups of rms do not show any change
in privatization status in our panel. A third group of 37 plants do see a switch in their
ownership status during our six-year panel. These are the plants that were privatized during
2005-2009. 23 plants were privatized in 2005, six plants were privatized in each of 2006, ve
in 2007, and the remaining three were privatized in 2008 and 2009.
As shown in Table 4, nearly half of the samples plant-year observations come from
Romania. One-quarter of our sample comes from Poland. Hungary and Bulgaria each
4A complete list of ownership data sources is available from the authors upon request.
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Table 2: Energy Utility Plants in LCPD vs Sample
Country: LCPD Sample
Bulgaria 36 36
Czech Rep. 86 13
Hungary 38 34
Poland 80 78
Romania 162 159
Total 402 320
contribute approximately ten percent of the sample plants and plants in the Czech Republic
comprise the nal four percent of the sample. Each country has some state-owned plants
and some privately owned plant-year observations.
Our main dependent variable of interest is the annual sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions (in
kilotons) of each energy utility plant provided in the LCPD data. In our analysis we control
for the energy input (EI) of each plant where energy input is measured in petajoules. The
LCPD data also provides the rated maximum thermal input (MWTH) for each plant, and
a dummy (OptOut) variable which is 1 if a plant opted out of the LCPD emissions limits
under the limited life derogation clause and 0 if it did not. We construct a dummy state
versus private (SvP ) ownership variable which is 1 if the plant is owned by a private rm in
year t and 0 if a plant was under state ownership. Finally, we construct a dummy variable
for CHP vs power plant (CHP ) which is 1 if the plant is a CHP and 0 if it is a power plant
because these two types of plants do systematically di¤er in their observable characteristics
and activities. For example, power plants are over four times larger than CHPs in terms of
MWth rating in our sample.
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Table 3: Ownership by year
Year: Private State Total
2004 52 268 320
2005 75 245 320
2006 81 239 320
2007 86 234 320
2008 87 233 320
2009 89 231 320
Total 470 1450 1920
Note: There are 1920 plant-year observations.
As previously mentioned, the LCPD limits emissions from combustion plants of 50 MWth
or larger. The initial date of compliance for the LCPD was January 1, 2008. Plants would
not choose to reduce emissions before they are so required, unless it leads to higher prots by
doing so. Therefore, we do not anticipate that many rms would have undertaken the capi-
tal investment necessary to reduce emissions prior to the compliance date solely for LCPD
compliance. However, countries were required to begin reporting emissions information be-
ginning in 2004 so it is plausible that some forward looking plants did choose to abate some
emissions at that time. Also, we expect that plants might behave di¤erently with regards to
pollution once they have made the decision to opt out of the LCPD. For these reasons, we
do include an indicator variable in our analysis to control for any possible di¤erence in the
opted out plants (Opt Out). Table 5 shows the summary statistics for all variables.
Table 6 compares plant characteristics by ownership status. There are signicant di¤er-
ences in the energy input, thermal rating of plants (MWTH), LCPD opt out percentages,
and SO2 emissions between state-owned and privately held plants. Privatized plants are
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Table 4: Ownership by country
Country: Private State Total
Bulgaria 72 144 216
Czech Republic 52 26 78
Hungary 107 97 204
Poland 213 255 468
Romania 26 928 954
Total 470 1450 1920
Note: There are 1920 plant-year observations.
Table 5: Summary Statistics
Variable: Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
SO2 1851 5.795 22.470 0.00 337.205
Energy Input 1683 8.368 22.110 0.0 280.973
MWTH 1811 659.589 1139.023 0 12600
Opt Out 1914 .213 .410 0 1
Note: Energy Input is in Petajoule,
Table 6: Characteristics by Ownership
Variable: State-Owned Private-Owned t-test Obs.
SO2 5.28 7.37 -1.76  1851
Energy Input 7.21 12.10 -4.40 1683
MWTH 592.10 868.02 -4.72  1811
Opt Out 0.23 0.17 2.74  1914
Note: Means of all values are given.
Energy Input is in Petajoule. * signicant at 10%,
**signicant at 5%, *** signicant at 1%.
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over 47 percent larger in terms of thermal rating and use about 70 percent more fuel than
state-owned plants on average. Thus, private-owned plants may be operating with less ex-
cess capacity than state plants. A larger percentage of state-owned plants have opted out of
the LCPD emissions limits than privately owned plants. Finally, without controlling for any
plant characteristics, there is a signicant di¤erence in mean SO2 emissions with privately
owned plants emitting about 40 percent more than state-owned plants on average.
Figure 3 plots means of SO2 emission for state-owned plants and private plants for the
six years.5 In 2004, private plants have a much higher SO2 mean than state-owned plants
but this gap decreases substantially in subsequent years until there is almost no gap in 2009.
Interestingly, the mean for privatized plants is continuously decreasing with the exception
of the increase in 2006 from 2005 levels. The mean for state-owned rms increases over
the rst several years until 2006, when it begins to decrease. To the extent that privatized
plants would behave di¤erently in reaction to the nancial incentives of the EU ETS, its
implementation may have been a contributing factor to plants in the three EU10 countries
in our sample reducing their SO2 emissions in 2005.
5 Empirical Methodology
In the conceptual framework, we identify three reasons why state-owned plants might have
higher emissions than privatized plants and three reasons why privatized plants might have
higher emissions than state-owned plants. We aim to empirically investigate the link between
ownership status and environmental performance. We measure environmental performance
5Note that this gure includes all private and state-owned plants in each year of the sample and is not
focusing exclusively on the plants that switch ownership during the study period.
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Figure 3: Mean SO2 emissions for state-owned and privately-owned plants by year.
using both aggregate SO2 emissions and SO2 emissions per unit of energy (EI). Presumably,
policy-makers would be interested in both measures of environmental performance since
they are concerned with both the amount of environmental damage and the concentration
of SO2 emissions at individual plants. The amount of environmental damage will depend
mainly on aggregate emissions since SO2 is a regional pollutant and degradation will be
determined by the total amount of SO2 rather than the ratio of SO2 to energy input. The
concentration of SO2 at individual plants will be determined by relative emissions if energy
input is proportional to the amount of air coming through the plantssmokestacks. Similarly,
Earnhart and Lizal (2006) utilize relative emissions as measured by emissions per unit of
output as a proxy for emissions concentration.
SO2 emissions has a highly positively skewed distribution, so we utilize a log transfor-
mation for our dependent variable. We also log the non-indicator independent variables
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to provide an elasticity interpretation on these coe¢ cients. Thus, we specify the following
regression equations to examine the association between private versus state ownership and
SO2 emissions.
ln(SO2it) = 0 + 1SvPit + 2 ln(EIit) + 3CDit + 4OptOut+ 5CHP + i + "it (1)
and
ln(SO2=EI)it = 
r
0 + 
r
1SvPit + 
r
2CDit + 
r
3OptOut+ 
r
4CHP + i + "it (2)
where
SvPit =
1 if plant i is a privatized plant at time t and
0 if plant i is a state  owned plant at time t:
Energy input and thermal rating (mwth) are highly collinear since plants with a larger
thermal capacity will logically burn more fuel. In fact, the correlation is 0.93. Since emissions
should theoretically depend on the actual amount of fuel burned rather than the capacity
of the plant, we utilize energy input as our control. We control for LCPD opt out status
and di¤erences between CHP and power plants. Finally, we control for di¤erences across
countries with a set of country dummies (CDit). Unobservable plant-specic e¤ects are
represented by i: If there is 0 correlation between the i and the explanatory variables,
then both OLS and random e¤ects are consistent estimators. If, however, the explanatory
variables and the i are correlated, then OLS and random e¤ects are inconsistent estimators
24
and we should estimate using xed e¤ects. Thus, we would hesitate to utilize random
e¤ects or OLS estimation if we think there is some unobserved variable that is correlated
with our privatization variable and also raises or lowers emissions. There certainly could
be unobserved plant specic characteristics related to the privatization process that are
correlated with the level of emissions so we prefer to utilize a xed-e¤ects estimator from a
conceptual standpoint.6
There are two potential sources of endogeneity that could bias results if they are ignored.
First, there may be endogeneity from omitted variables that vary across plants. We may be
concerned that there is some unobserved factor that is causing plants to be selected for pri-
vatization and is also correlated with SO2 emissions. For example, perhaps only the plants
with better potential for emissions improvement are privatized and this potential would not
change throughout the six years of the panel. In this scenario, the xed e¤ects model ade-
quately controls for the unobserved heterogeneity. However, there might also be endogeneity
from omitted variables that vary within plants and across time. For example, suppose a
country decided to o¤er 20 plants for privatization in 2006. Furthermore, suppose none of
the 20 plants had installed scrubbers prior to 2006. Suppose that 10 of these plants then in-
stall scrubbers in 2007. Then, in 2008, these 10 plants were privatized because they became
more attractive for potential bidders with the scrubbers already installed. SO2 emissions at
these 10 plants in 2008 and subsequent years decrease relative to 2006 (and perhaps 2007)
simply because the abatement technology was installed right before privatization occurred.
In this hypothetical example, the xed e¤ects model would not adequately control for un-
6For example, we do not have nancial information about the plants which may well be correlated with
privatization and emissions.
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observed heterogeneity since the omitted variable, investment in abatement technology, is
changing throughout the panel. To address this potential source of endogeneity, we utilize
an instrumental variables approach as a robustness check.
For our instrumental variable we construct a country political variable using the PAR-
LINE database on national parliaments.7 For each country we collect information on the
number of elected o¢ cials in the government by political association. We then classify each
political party as either pro or anti-privatization. In general, the pro European Union center-
right parties are in strong favor of privatization,whereas the center-left governments are in
favor of slow privatization with keeping many of the strategic state-owned rms, such as
utilities, in governments control or are completely anti-privatization. We dene our politi-
cal variable as percentage of center-right seats held by o¢ cials in a given county in a given
year. If the country has two chambers of government then we rst calculate the percentage
of center-right seats held by o¢ cials in each chamber and then we average the two. This way
we obtain percentage of government that is pro privatization for each year in each country.
Elections were usually held every few years and this impacted privatization. For example,
the Polish privatization program was held back once the euro-skeptic, center-left govern-
ment took over in 2005. In October 2007, a center-right government won the election and
privatization programs were renewed starting 2008.
Because of the di¤erences in political partieseconomic ideology and the direct control
the majority party of a government has on privatization, we believe that our IV is a strong
predictor of privatization taking place. At the same time political control should have no
impact on plant level emissions. As we stated before, the reduction of emissions was driven
7The data was downloaded in June 2012 from http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp
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by the European Union and less so by individual governments. In our sample of countries,
the pro environment green parties were never in serious contention for government control.
Czech Republic had the highest number of green party government seats with three percent
in the Chamber of Deputies during the 2006 election. The higher representation of green
candidates in the Czech Republic may be related to why the Czech Republic was the only
country in our sample to le a national reduction plant that was slightly more stringent than
the LCPD.
6 Results
We have a panel of six years on privatization status, energy usage, plant size, and SO2
emissions. We estimate equations (1) and (2) using the three standard panel estimators of
pooled OLS, random e¤ects, and xed e¤ects. The model test statistics are shown in Tables
7 (estimates for Equation (1)) and 8 (estimates for Equation (2)). The F-test for plant-
specic e¤ects shows signicant individual e¤ects in each of our specications. Thus, we do
not report the pooled OLS results since they are not consistent. A Hausman test indicates
that random e¤ects results are not consistent in specication (II). Thus, we utilize the xed
e¤ects estimates as our baseline but also present the random e¤ects results in Tables 7 and
8 for comparison. The random e¤ects results can also be informative since we can test for
di¤erences in emissions based upon characteristics that do not vary within a rm throughout
the panel, such as opt-out status and type of plant, power or CHP.
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Table 7: Fixed E¤ects (FE) and Random E¤ects (RE) Results (Aggregate Emissions)
ln SO2 emissions (I-FE) (II-FE) (III-RE) (IV-RE) (V-RE)
SvPit -0.449  -0.547  -0.430  -0.537  -0.438 
(0.168) (0.205) (0.164) (0.181) (0.183)
ln Energy Inputit 0.727  0.908  0.877
(0.181) (0.128) (0.130)
Opt Outi -0.270
(0.493)
CHPi -1.338 
(0.385)
no. of. obs. 1319 1230 1316 1230 1227
Overall R2 0.004 0.557 0.200 0.614 0.619
Hausman p-value 0.904 0.000
F-test p-value for FE 0.008 0.000
Note: * signicant at 10%, **signicant at 5%, *** signicant at 1%.
Standard Errors in parentheses are clustered at plant level and are robust.
Table 8: Fixed E¤ects (FE) and Random E¤ects (RE) Results (Relative Emissions)
ln SO2 emissions per Energy (VI - FE) (VII - RE) (VIII - RE)
SvPit -0.529  -0.547  -0.465 
(0.205) (0.180) (0.179)
Opt Outi -0.275
(0.382)
CHPi -1.137 
(0.276)
no. of. obs. 1230 1230 1227
Overall R2 0.002 0.166 0.189
Hausman p-value 0.912
F-test p-value for FE 0.010
Note: * signicant at 10%, **signicant at 5%, *** signicant at 1%.
Standard Errors in parentheses are clustered at plant level and are robust.
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6.1 Fixed E¤ects Results
When we estimate a xed-e¤ects model, we are identifying the e¤ect of privatization from
the 37 plants that switch ownership during the study period. The coe¢ cient on our main
variable of interest, SvP , is negative and statistically signicant in all specications. That
is, privatization is associated with decreased emissions both in an absolute sense and on a
relative basis. When we do not control for the amount of energy consumed by a plant in
specication (I), switching from state to private ownership is associated with a decrease in
aggregate SO2 emissions of around 45 percent. For our preferred specication (II), where
we do control for the amount of energy consumed by a plant, privatization is associated with
a decrease in SO2 emissions of around 55 percent.8 For specication (V I), privatization is
associated with a 53 percent reduction in relative emissions.9
6.2 Random E¤ects Results
When we estimate a random e¤ects model, we are identifying the e¤ect of privatization both
from the variation within plants that switch ownership and from the variation across all
sample plants. We note that the random e¤ects results are qualitatively similar to the xed
e¤ects results. SvP is statistically signicant in all specications with an estimated scale
that is similar to the xed e¤ects regressions for both absolute and relative emissions. Opt
out status is not signicant so it does not appear that SO2 emissions are being impacted by
plants deciding to opt out of LCPD regulations during the study period. Recall that power
8Specication (II) is preferred to specication (I) on the basis of a Wald test.
9As a robustness check, we also split the sample into two groups, CHPs and power plants. Fixed e¤ects
regressions on both subsamples produce negative and signicant coe¢ cients on SvP .
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plants are over four times larger than CHPs in this sample. Even after controlling for the
amount of energy utilized, CHPs emit signicantly less SO2:
6.3 IV Results
Table 9 gives IV results for absolute emissions and Table 10 shows IV results for relative
emissions. We note that the sign on SvP is negative and signicant for all IV specications.
We nd that the IV estimates are signicantly di¤erent from their non-IV counterparts in
specications (IX), (XII), and (XIV ). Here, the IV estimates are preferred since the non-
IV estimates are inconsistent. For the other specications, we fail to reject the null that there
is no systematic di¤erence between the IV and non-IV estimates. For these specications,
we prefer the non-IV estimates because they are consistent and more e¢ cient than the IV
estimates. A Wald Test between specications (IX) and (X) conrms that energy input is
an important independent variable. Hence, specication (II) remains our overall preferred
specication.10
7 Discussion
Our results are consistent with Hypotheses 2, 3a, and 4a and inconsistent with Hypotheses 1,
3b, and 4b. Since Hypothesis 2 is framed in terms of plants making changes once privatized,
we more closely examine the 37 plants that were privatized during our study period to see
whether the change in ownership results in changes that are consistent with the hypothesis.
Table 11 displays the distribution of these 37 plants across the sample countries and Table 12
10First stage results for all IV regressions are available upon request.
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Table 9: Fixed E¤ects (FE) and Random E¤ects (RE) IV Results (Aggregate Emissions)
ln SO2 emissions (IX - FE) (X - FE) (XI - RE) (XII - RE) (XIII - RE)
SvPit -8.923  -9.183  -8.250  -9.161  -9.271 
(4.403) (4.297) (4.327) (3.878) (3.896)
ln Energy Inputit 0.704  0.736  0.728 
(0.078) (0.069) (0.070)
Opt Outi -0.300
(1.739)
CHPi -0.118
(1.905)
no. of. obs. 1319 1230 1319 1230 1227
Overall R2 0.004 0.033 0.041 0.165 0.161
Hausman p-value for IV 0.054 0.132 0.637 0.018 0.1144
F-test p-value for FE 0.000 0.000
Note: * signicant at 10%, **signicant at 5%, *** signicant at 1%.
Standard Errors in parentheses are clustered at plant level and are robust.
Table 10: Fixed E¤ects (FE) and Random E¤ects (RE) IV Results (Relative Emissions)
ln SO2 emissions per Energy (XIV - FE) (XV - RE) (XVI - RE)
SvPit -8.990  -9.062  -9.147 
(4.272) (3.983) (3.994)
Opt Outi -0.312
(0.922)
CHPi 0.308
(1.165)
no. of. obs. 1230 1230 1227
Overall R2 0.002 0.024 0.022
Hausman p-value for IV 0.047 0.332 0.576
F-test p-value for FE 0.000
Note: * signicant at 10%, **signicant at 5%, *** signicant at 1%.
Standard Errors in parentheses are clustered at plant level and are robust.
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Table 11: Country Distribution of Plants that Switch Ownership
Country: Number of Switching Plants (Percent)
Bulgaria 11 (29.73)
Czech Republic 8 (21.62)
Hungary 3 (8.11)
Poland 11 (29.73)
Romania 4 (10.81)
Total 37 (100)
gives characteristics of these 37 plants before and after privatization. Recall that Hypothesis
2 states that state-owned plants are acting ine¢ ciently by spending too little money on
control costs. In this story, private ownership increases prots by reducing emissions. The
reduction in emissions makes more e¢ cient use of inputs, decreases emission charges, and
decreases regulatory attention and penalties. According to Table 12, this does seem to be
a likely explanation as mean SO2 emissions are signicantly reduced by over 70 percent
after these 37 plants are privatized. At the same time, the point estimate of mean energy
input is only cut by approximately 20 percent when plants are privatized, and this is not a
statistically signicant decrease. Thus, these plants are not using signicantly less energy
but they are polluting less. Furthermore, the mean size of the privatized plants (MWTH)
is not signicantly reduced with privatization, so it is not simply a case of private owners
buying the plants and dismantling them.
Hypothesis 3a proposes that state-owned plants are acting optimally but are not getting
as much regulatory pressure as privatized plants. Privatized plants might face extra regu-
latory scrutiny because they dont have the same political connections or because the state
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Table 12: Characteristics of Plants That Were Privatized During Years of 2004-2009: Before
and After Privatization
Variable: State-Owned (Before) Private-Owned (After) t-test Obs.
SO2 9.03 2.82 2.11 214
Energy Input 7.62 6.00 1.08 166
MWTH 671.10 574.62 0.87 210
Note: Means of all values are given. Energy Input is in 10000s GJ.
* signicant at 10%, **signicant at 5%, *** signicant at 1%.
expected a priori for the privatized plants to be worse environmental performers. In this
case, we examine our full sample because both within and between variation is relevant for
this hypothesis. Ideally we would have some information about the frequency or severity
of penalties levied against state and private owned plants. However, in absence of such in-
formation, the opt-out variable does potentially convey some useful information. Revisiting
Table 6, we see that state-owned plants are signicantly more likely to opt-out of the LCPD
regulations than private-owned plants. While this is purely descriptive and does not control
for other di¤erences between state and privatized plants, state-owned plants are nearly twice
as likely to opt out of the LCPD under the limited life derogation clause than are privatized
plants. If state-owned plants truly did not face much regulatory oversight, we might expect
very few of the plants to opt-out of the LCPD. That is, even if the state-owned plants were
severely polluting, we might expect them to continue to operate with the regulators ignoring
the pollution. We suspect that the admittance of these nations to the EU in mid 2000s
negated much of the regulation advantage that state-owned plants had held, if there ever
was one. Recall that Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary joined the EU in 2004 while
Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU in 2007.
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Finally, Hypothesis 4a posits that privatized plants are again opting optimally and have
more relative concern for environmental protection. Privatized plants may have more relative
concern for environmental protection because of dynamic concerns. For example, the owner
of a privatized plant that achieves admirable environmental performance may have more
success in acquiring more plants in the future because the state will regard them as less
environmentally risky. While we cannot rule out this possibility, we nd it to be the least
likely explanation of the three.
8 Conclusion
Eastern European countries continue to reform their energy utilities markets and privati-
zation continues to be a focal point of the reforms. To understand the full impact of pri-
vatization policies, we must understand how privatized rms di¤er from their state-owned
counterparts. We investigate the environmental performance as gauged by SO2 emissions for
Eastern European energy utilities plants between the years of 2004 and 2009. Controlling
for both observable and unobservable plant characteristics, we nd that privatized energy
utilities plants emit less SO2 than state-owned plants.
By exploiting within plant variation, we nd that privatized plants annually emit around
55 percent less SO2 than state-owned plants on average. Compared with an overall sample
mean annual SO2 emissions of approximately six kilotons, this estimated scale of the dif-
ference in SO2 emissions based upon ownership status is environmentally signicant. The
adverse e¤ects of SO2 are well known and include inducing respiratory problems and con-
tributing to acid rain. Thus, an annual reduction of over three kilotons of SO2 emissions can
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have noticeable impacts, especially on a local scale. This should likely give some comfort
to citizens of these Eastern European countries that are concerned about the environmental
performance of newly privatized energy utilities plants.
Our novel data set combines ownership information with SO2 emissions and energy use
measures. We capture a substantial majority of the energy utilities plants in Bulgaria, Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. This is the rst study that we are aware of that
investigates emissions for these countries based upon privatization status.11
Instead of using energy usage as a proxy for emissions, we utilize actual SO2 emissions
as reported to the EU under the Large Combustion Plant Directive. We can then employ
energy usage as an important explanatory variable in our regression analyses. Furthermore,
using energy input as a proxy for SO2 emissions could be misleading since there are several
other signicant predictors of emissions aside from energy, as we show in our analysis.
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